Editorials october 4, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
though, is that the
two anti-terrorism statutes that the BJP today
makes much of – the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of
1987 (TADA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act
of 2002 (POTA) – have been instruments of State
terror and victimisation of the vulnerable, rather than credible mechanisms of
justice. Convictions secured under TADA were
a dismally low proportion of the total number of cases lodged. And the only
significant case prosecuted under POTA –
the 2001 attack on India’s Parliament compound – ended in a fiasco, with some
of the country’s most senior lawyers arguing the case for the accused in the
Supreme Court and denouncing the Delhi police for flagrantly concocting
evidence.
To allow confessions made to the
police as evidence in terrorism trials would do little else than arbitrarily
empower an already lawless and unaccountable police force. It would deepen
institutional prejudices against the religious minorities and enlarge the scope
for criminal collusion between police forces all over the country and the
agents of majoritarian mayhem and disorder, such as the Bajrang Dal. Clearly,
the country does not need a more powerful police force or a judiciary that has the
authority to dispense summary justice. Without a firm reiteration and
institutionalisation of the long-forgotten verity of equality before the law,
the war against terrorism may well be lost even before it is joined. Branded for Life The
State shows no sensitivity to the needs of the denotified and nomadic tribes
who remain on the fringes of society. The
plight of India’s 150 million denotified and nomadic tribes (DNT) rarely figures in the public discourse. Recently,
the National Commission for Denotified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes (NCDNSNT) proposed that these people
should be notified as a scheduled community by amending the Constitution and 10
per cent of government jobs should be reserved for them even if the total
reservation quota exceeds the 50 per cent ceiling imposed by the Supreme Court.
However, the ministry of social justice, under which the NCDNSNT was set up, expressed “strong
reservations” against such an amendment to create a new category and a separate
quota.
A majority
of the DNT (approximately
1,500 nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and 198 denotified tribes) are classified
as scheduled castes (SC),
scheduled tribes (ST) or other
backward classes (OBC). To
complicate matters, the same tribe is classified differently in different
states. For example, the banjaras are classified as ST in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa and elsewhere, SC in Karnataka, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and a few
other states, as OBC in Uttar
Pradesh and as DNT in
Maharashtra. It is the same with the other denotified tribes like the berad,
kaikadi, pardhis, sansis, budhuks, vadars and so on and the nomadic tribes like
the gondhalis, garuds, chitrakathis, kalbelias, bazigars, nats, madaris,
kanjars. However, despite being thus categorised, welfare measures meant for
the SC/ST/OBC communities
are of little use considering their singular backwardness. They live in tents
on vacant lands on the outskirts of villages or in the flimsiest of shanties
in urban areas where basic amenities are unknown. The lack of a permanent
address, ration cards or any official documents and the resultant difficulty in
getting caste certificates ensure that they are officially non-existent and
hence ineligible for any benefits. (The NCDNSNT has recommended a “tent to tent” survey within six
months and a community-wise census.)
Traditionally,
these groups were pastoralists and hunter-gatherer nomads (shepherds and small
game hunters like the dhangars, kuruba and pardhis), providers of community
services (blacksmiths like the ghisadi, stone dressers like the vadars,
transporters and salt traders like the banjaras, roof-thatchers like the chapparband)
and entertainers (acrobats and jugglers like the dombaris, snake charmers like
the madaris). The British administration refused to acknowledge the impact of
its rule on the livelihoods of these tribes, which made many of them turn to
crime. The infamous Criminal Tribes Act 1871 provided for the registration,
surveillance and control of these tribes whom the local administration believed,
were addicted to the systematic commission of non-bailable offences”, giving
them no recourse to the judicial system, herding them into settlements and
extracting hard labour from them in factories, quarries and plantations.
Ironically, while this law was
repealed following independence (tribes notified as criminals were thus
“denotified”), it was replaced by the Habitual Offenders Act 1959. The latter
asks police to investigate a suspect’s criminal tendencies and whether his/her
occupation is “conducive to a settled way of life”. It has resulted in the
police and local authorities systematically hounding these tribes, deepening
popular prejudices against them in the public mind. In February 2000, the
National Human Rights Commission recommended that the 1952 Act be repealed and
in March 2007 the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination suggested the same. In the urban areas, legislation regarding
inhibition of beggary, prevention of cruelty to animals, and objectionable advertisements
are used to harass the DNT. While
these laws are enforced, there is no well-thought out plan to provide the
tribes with other means of livelihood.
The ministry of social justice
does not favour the setting up of a permanent commission for them because it
cannot find evidence of large-scale atrocities (the NCDNSNT has recommended bringing them
under the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989). DNT leaders (the formation of tribe-wise associations has
led to the absence of a cohesive leadership that can speak on behalf of all the
denotified tribes) want the government to add a chapter in the Third Schedule
of the Constitution and categorise them as Scheduled DNT.
The complex history of the DNT and their abysmal living conditions now call for programmes that
include sensitisation editorials
It is a matter of great alarm that the Union Home Ministry has not taken the
draft national counter-terrorism doctrine seriously, and as a result has not
even come close to implementing it. This draft doctrine was formulated in 2006
by the Intelligence Bureau in consultation with the police forces of some
States and Central Police organisations. The Government’s lethargy in taking
counter-terrorism seriously is inexplicable given the threat to national
security that terrorism poses. The doctrine stresses the use of pre-emptive
strikes and covert action to protect national security. It also puts forward
compelling arguments in favour of using adequate force instead of minimum force
to combat terrorist activities. More importantly, the doctrine stresses that the
country should employ all means, including diplomatic, economic,
administrative, legal and military, to counter terrorism. Such a policy has
long been needed as in its absence the country has been seriously handicapped
on the security front. This has allowed terrorists to get away with many
outrages which could have been prevented. So far, especially so under the UPA
regime, the country has followed a soft line against terrorism. This is in
stark contrast to the hardline stand that countries like Israel maintain for
which they have been better off. The United States took strong measures
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attack, as a result of which since then
there hasn’t been a single terror strike on US soil. But despite several
attacks over the last five years, the UPA Government has not deemed it fit to
formulate a strong action plan against terror. This is totally unacceptable and
goes to show the extent to which certain political parties are dictated to by
vote-bank politics.
No one can deny that the provocations for a tough response to terror have been strong. From the attack on Parliament to the shocking fidayeen strike on Mumbai last year, scores of innocent men, women and children have fallen victim to terrorism. These attacks have also created a sense of insecurity among the people which also needs to be overturned and confidence restored. The soft policy of the Indian state has allowed terrorist cells to proliferate in the country and has enabled them to widen their ambit of operations by gathering funds, setting up training camps, and recruiting fresh foot-soldiers to their heinous cause. At the same time terrorist camps have flourished in India’s neighbourhood, both across the LoC and in Bangladesh. These camps should also have been dealt with an iron fist. It is therefore a must for the incoming Government to keep the national counter-terrorism doctrine high on the agenda when it comes to power.
No one can deny that the provocations for a tough response to terror have been strong. From the attack on Parliament to the shocking fidayeen strike on Mumbai last year, scores of innocent men, women and children have fallen victim to terrorism. These attacks have also created a sense of insecurity among the people which also needs to be overturned and confidence restored. The soft policy of the Indian state has allowed terrorist cells to proliferate in the country and has enabled them to widen their ambit of operations by gathering funds, setting up training camps, and recruiting fresh foot-soldiers to their heinous cause. At the same time terrorist camps have flourished in India’s neighbourhood, both across the LoC and in Bangladesh. These camps should also have been dealt with an iron fist. It is therefore a must for the incoming Government to keep the national counter-terrorism doctrine high on the agenda when it comes to power.
7
Economic &
Political Weekly EPW october 4, 2008
of the
police, the bureaucracy, and the citizenry, the provision of free and
compulsory education and low-cost housing. Until now, the DNT have physically and figuratively been on the fringes of
Indian society. To draw them in will need the joint efforts of their fractured
leadership, the State and civil society. Crisis
in Bolivia Eva
Morales uses democratic and diplomatic means to tackle right-wing opposition.The domestic and
international reaction to the Left parties that are in office in a number of
countries in South America – most notably in Bolivia and Venezuela – has tended
to utilise violent, non-democratic and even means of sabotage to destabilise
the regimes. The ongoing developments in Bolivia are the most notable examples
of the tactics of the opposition.
Bolivia is
home to one of the most concentrated landownership patterns, particularly in
the east, where a handful of big estate owners control large tracts of land. It
is also home to vast reserves of natural gas and oil. In response to moves by
the government headed by the socialist Eva Morales for a more equitable
distribution of resources, the recent months have seen multiple attempts by a
variety of right-wing, conservative and propertied forces to destabilise the
country, allegedly aided and abetted by the United States (which needless to
state has always gone out of its way to undermine elected Left governments in
South America).
Eva
Morales, the leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), is the
first person of indigenous origin to be elected president of the country. Since
coming to power in 2005, his government has tried to address the various
inequalities in the vastly poor and land-locked country through land reforms,
redistribution of returns from oil and natural gas production, and by enacting
a new egalitarian constitution. The draft constitution, prepared after Morales
came to power, envisages redistribution of wealth garnered from the extraction
of natural resources to poorer provinces in the west and for use in funding
welfare programmes that will benefit the poor, most of whom belong to long
suppressed indigenous communities living on poor wages and by subsistence
farming.
Predictably,
these moves have received stiff resistance from the conservative elites in the
country, particularly those governing the energy-rich and mestizo (people of
mixed, European and indigenous, ancestry) dominated provinces in the east, such
as Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija. To pre-empt these moves, the governors
of the eastern provinces organised referendums on autonomy, which were deemed
separatist and illegal by the central authority. In response to these
referendums, Morales announced a national recall referendum for himself and
vice president Alvaro Garcia, a risky move but one that paid off for Morales as
he won 67 per cent of the vote, much higher than the percentage garnered in the
elections in 2005.
Morales,
following his victory, has tried to back a new political constitution set to be
put to vote next year through another national referendum. This draft
constitution includes concessions on autonomy as demanded by the provincial
governors, who have formed a right-wing umbrella organisation, the National
Democratic Council (Conalde), in opposition to Morales’ MAS. Yet, the response by Conalde since the recall
referendum has been to take absolute control of these provinces by the use of
force in capturing central government-run institutions, particularly the land
reform offices and gas companies.
The crisis in September was
precipitated when Morales alleged that the US was playing the role of an agent provocateur and charged the US ambassador of conspiring with the rebel governors.
Relations between the US and the
Morales-led government have never been very cordial, with the former using its
policy of “War against Drugs” to undercut its relations with the Bolivian
government. Morales has steadfastly opposed any moves to ban coca farming, as
this is used for medicinal and herbal treatment purposes in the country.
When the crisis grew and violent
incidents in the provinces began taking place, the US ambassador to Bolivia was expelled, triggering a
reciprocal response by Washington. The role of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in funding initiatives by these
provincial governors in the near past has also been called into question. This
is not surprising, as the US has a
history of meddling and intervening in South American countries going back to
the Salvador Allende era in Chile, a trend that has been infused with new
vigour after the shift to the left in many countries in the continent.
The Morales government has reacted
with restraint to the violent tactics of the conservative opposition. It has
garnered support in many countries in South America, which have rallied to the
side of the Bolivian government and have denounced any moves that would be
detrimental to the unity of the country. Resisting pressure from many quarters
to stop being “pacifist” in dealing with the violent opposition groups, the
Morales government has held on to this path despite provocations such as the
massacre of MAS supporters
in the Pando province. Morales’ patient and steady response has yielded a few
dividends as the army – whose leadership is dominated by conservatives – has
now come out on the side of the central government placing the opposition on
the defensive.
The Bolivian story shows once again that the right-wing
opposition in the continent will use any tactic to defeat radical reform, even
of the social democratic variety. In this case, the conservatives in the rich
provinces of the east have exploited the issue of regional autonomy to
undermine the programmes to address centuries of economic exploitation and
inequity in Bolivia. The constant mobilisation of the people through democratic
means and building solidarity with international players must continue for the
reform process to succeed. In this regard, the Morales government is on the
right track.
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