Mishra was in jail after being accused of engineering the bomb attack on former minister Nand Gopal Nandi on July 2010. Nandi, who was minister in the then ruling Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), was injured in the blast but a journalist and a police guard were killed. Mishra fought election from Gyanpur assembly constituency from inside jail and won. The MLA recently got bail and was released on Tuesday evening.
The video footage shows Mishra's daughter Seema, while sitting in her SUV along with father, distributing cash as 'tips' to the police personnel deployed in the jail to gaurd prisoners. Police personnel jostled to grab the currency and were seen thanking MLA's daughter. While politicians getting VIP treatment in jails is a common feature in UP, Mishra's case reflects how brazenly ruling party MLAs are breaking law.
Earlier, in June this year, Mishra, who was given permission by the court to attend assembly proceedings, flouted orders and went to attend the lunch hosted by chief minister Akhilesh Yadav for Congress's presidential candidate Pranab Mukherji when he came to Lucknow for campaign. Similarly, another mafia-turned-politician and MLA from Mau assembly constituency, Mukhtar Ansari, also in jail, was present during the lunch.
Mishra has 62 criminal cases against him. He was arrested and put behind bars during the Maywati rule. The government also slapped Mishra with National Security Act (NSA). The SP, during its campaign for assembly election earlier this year, had announced that if voted to power, it will withdraw all cases slapped against Mishra during the Mayawati rule. The SP described cases against Mishra as 'politically motivated'.
IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT OF THE ENDS OF JUSTICE
"There can be no more important requirement of the ends
of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial; and it is for the
continuance of such a fair trial that the (inherent) powers of the High Courts
are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that
accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing
the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, if an accused person who is
released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape
the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the (inherent)
power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair
trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that
he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other
words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail
puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is no other
remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case
the (inherent) power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked. In regard
to non-bailable offences there is no need to invoke such power because S.
497(5) specifically deals with such cases."
When a question is answered expressly or by necessary
implication by Supreme Court the answer cannot be ignored by referring to the
decisions appealed against and holding that the real question that must be
considered to have been answered was something else. What the judges expressly
decided or what they must be considered to have decided by necessary
implication by reference to the facts stated by the Judges themselves are what
constitute precedents
BALESHWAR DASS V. STATE OF U.P., (1981) 1 SCR 449 : (AIR
1981 SC 41)
Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P., (1981) 1 SCR 449 : (AIR
1981 SC 41) and subsequently followed in several decisions, that ordinarily in
the absence of any specific rule of seniority governing the cadre or service,
the length of continuous officiation should be counted in reckoning seniority
as between direct recruits and promotees, should also be extended in
determining seniority of such ad hoc employees viv-a-vis direct recruits, and
whether the failure on the part of the Government to count the entire period of
officiation as such ad hoc employees would be per se arbitrary and irrational
and thus violative of Arts. 14 and 16(l) of the Constitution inasmuch as the
temporary service in the post in question was not for a short period intended
to meet some emergent or unforeseen circumstances, but to meet the exigencies
of the service. It is asserted that the recent pronouncement of this Court in
the case of Narender Chadha v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 157. (AIR 1986 SC
638) supports this view. The argument at first blush appears to be plausible
but on deeper consideration is not worthy of acceptance. We proceed to give
reasons therefor.
We are not aware of any principle or rule which lays down
that the length of continuous officiation service is the only relevant
criterion in determining seniority in a particular cadre or grade, irrespective
of any specific rule of seniority to the contrary. It is necessary to emphasise
that the principles laid down in the two leading cases of N. K. Chauhan and S.
B. Patwardhan, (AIR 1977 SC 2051) reiterated in Baleshwar Dass' case (AIR 1981
SC 41) and subsequently followed in several decisions are not an authority for
any such proposition. These decisions particularly that in Baleshwar Dass' case
clearly lay down that ordinarily and in the absence of any specific rule of
seniority governing the cadre or service, the length of continuous officiation
should be counted in reckoning seniority as between direct recruits and
promotees. These authorities nowhere lay down that the same principle i.e. the
length of continuous officiation must be the sole guiding factor and the only
criterion in determining seniority of such ad hoc employees vis-a-vis direct
recruits.
. We feet it necessary to emphasise that the principles laid
down by this Court in the two cases of N.K. Chauhan, (AIR 1977 SC 251) and S.B.
Patwardhan. (AIR 1977 SC 2051) which were reiterated in Baleshwar Dass case,
(AIR 1981 SC 41 ) and subsequently followed in several other cases do not lay
down any principle to the contrary. These cases are not an authority for the
proposition relied upon. On the contrary, they clearly proceed on the principle
that persons appointed on an ad hoc basis or for fortuitous reasons or by
stop-gap arrangement, constitute a class which is separate and distinct from
those who are appointed to posts in the service in strict conformity with the
rules of recruitment. In the case of S.B. Patwardhan, Chandrachud, C.J.,
observed :
NO MAN CAN BE A JUDGE IN HIS OWN CAUSE :-
It is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence
that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable
likelihood of bias it is "in accordance with natural justice and
common-sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated
from sitting". The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or
in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. What
is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted
with bias @page-SC455 but that the circumstances are such as to create a
reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of
bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that
justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. It is also
important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power
stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an
independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision
between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the courts
alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly
between contenting parties. The strict standards applied to authorities
exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative
bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare
State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid
pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions
in a fair and just manner.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION - SELECTION OF CANDIDATES - BIAS
Constitution of India, Art.316, Art.226 - Public Service
Commission - Selection of candidates - Bias - Close relative of a member of
Commission appearing for selection - Member need not completely withdraw from
selection process - Sufficient, if he does not participate in interview of that
candidate.
There can be no doubt that if a selection committee is
constituted for the purpose of selecting candidates on merits and one of the
members of the Selection Committee is closely related to a candidate appearing
for the selection, it would not be enough for such member merely to withdraw
from participation in the interview of the candidate related to him but he must
withdraw altogether from the entire selection process and ask the authorities
to nominate another person in his place on the selections made would be
vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of
selection. However, the principle which requires that a member of a Selection
Committee whose close relative is appearing for selection should decline to
become a member of the selection committee or withdraw from it leaving it to
the appointing authority to nominate another person in his place need not be
applied an case of a Constitutional Authority like the Public Service
Commission, whether Central or State. If a member of a Public Service
Commission were to withdraw altogether from the selection process on the ground
that a close relative of his is appearing for selection, no other person save a
member can be substituted in his place. And it may sometimes happen that no
other member is available to take the place of such member and the functioning
of the Public Service Commission may be affected. When two or more members of a
Public Service Commission are holding a viva voce examination, they are
functioning not as individuals but as the Public Service Commission. Of course,
when a close relative of a member of a Public Service Commission is appearing
for interview, such member must withdraw from participation in the interview of
that candidate and must not take part in any discussion in regard to the merits
of that candidate and even the marks or credits given to that candidate should
not be disclosed to him.
Constitution of India, Art.14 and Art.16 - Appointment of
teachers on ad hoc basis at commencement of year and terminating their services
before summer vacation - Policy of State Government in following such practice
is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 - State Government directed to make
appointments as per rules and fill up vacancies in which teachers who are
working on ad hoc basis are now working.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IS A BASIC AND ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION
It is judicial review is a basic and essential feature of
the Constitution now well-settled as a result of the decision of this Court in
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 206: (AIR 1980 SC 1789) that
judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and no law
passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can abrogate it or
take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or taken away the
Constitution will cease to be what it is. It is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional scheme that every organ of the State, every authority under the
Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and has to act within the
limits of such power. It is a limited Government which we have under the
Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to act within the
limits of the power conferred upon them under the Constitution. Now a question
may arise as to what are the powers of the Executive and whether the Executive
has acted within the scope of its power. Such a question obviously cannot be
left to the Executive to decide and for two very good reasons. First the
decision of the question would depend upon the interpretation of the
Constitution and the laws and this would pre-eminently be a matter fit to be
decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which alone would be
possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the constitutional and legal
protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to
the executive to determine the legality of its own action. So also if the
legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in making the law, the
legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the law
is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions of the
Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left to the
determination of the legislature. The Constitution has, therefore created an
independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent
machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to
determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation
passed by the legislature. The judiciary is constituted the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution and to it is assigned the delicate task of
determining what is the extent and scope of the power conferred on each branch
of Government, what are the limits on the exercise of such power under the
Constitution and whether any action of any branch transgresses such limits. It
is also a basic principle of the Rule of Law which permeates every provision of
the Constitution and which forms its very core and essence that the exercise of
power by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by
the Constitution but also be in accordance with law and it is the judiciary
which has to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the
requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This
function is discharged by the judiciary by exercise of the power of judicial
review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for
maintenance of the Rule of Law. The power of judicial review is an integral
part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government of
laws and the Rule of Law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of
unreality. That is why I observed in my judgement in Minerva Mills Ltd. case,
(AIR 1980 SC 1789) (supra) at pages 287 and 288 of (1981) 1 SCR: (at p. 1825
and 1826 of AIR) :-
"I am of the view that if there is one feature of our
Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the
maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial
review and it is unquestionably. To my mind, part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that
however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for
judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish to emphasis is
that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be
abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a
constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is
provided that the validity of any law made by the Legislature shall not be
liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the
legislative competence of the legislature or is violative of any fundamental
rights, it @page-SC389 would be nothing short of subversion of the
Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights
meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has
the effect of taking away the power of judicial review and providing that no
amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be questioned on any
ground, even if such amendment is violative of the basic structure and,
therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would be making
Parliament sole judge of the constitutional validity of what it has done and
that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending
power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution. The conclusion
must therefore inevitably follow that Cl. (4) of the Art. 368 is
unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the
Constitution."
It is undoubtedly true that my judgement in Minerva Mills
Ltd. case (AIR 1980 SC 1789) (supra) was a minority judgement but so far as
this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held
that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and
it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the
Constitution and it is equally clear from the same decision that though
judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the
Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can certainly,
without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, set up effective
alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review. The
basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it
would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to
substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional
mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is not less
efficacious than the High Court. Then, instead of the High Court, it would be
another institutional mechanisin or authority which would be exercising the
power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional
limitations and maintaining the Rule of Law. Therefore, if any constitutional
amendment made by Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of
judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional
mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure
doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, namely, that the
alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the parliamentary
amendment is no less effective than the High Court.
Here, in the present case, the impugned Act has been enacted
by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by Cl. (1) of Art. 323-A which
was introduced in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.
Cl. (2)(d) of this Article provides that a law made by Parliament under Cl. (1)
may exclude the jurisdiction of Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Art. 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in
Cl. (1). The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226
and 227 by any law made by Parliament under Cl. (1) of Art. 323A is, therefore,
specifically authorised by the constitutional amendment enacted in Cl. (2)(d)
of that Article. It is clear from the discussion in the preceding paragraph
that this constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 postulates for its validity that the law
made under Cl. (1) of Art. 323A excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Arts. 226 and 227 must provide for an effective alternative institutional
mechanism or authority for judicial review. If this constitutional amendment
were to permit a law made under Cl. (1) of Art. 323A to exclude the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 without setting up an
effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial
review, it would be violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside
the constituent power of Parliament. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in
this constitutional amendment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave a void
but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and
vest the power of judicial review in it. Consequently, the impugned Act
excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court Under Arts. 226 and 227 in respect
of service matters and vesting such jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal
can pass the test of constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage
of Cl. (2)(d) of Art. 323A, only if it can be shown that the Administrative
Tribunal set up under the impugned Act is equally efficacious as the High
Court, so far as the power of judicial review over service matter is concerned.
We must, therefore, address ourselves to the question whether the
Administrative Tribunal established under the impugned Act can be regarded as
equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review as
the High Court acting under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which
are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of
the Constitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up under the
impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and
applicability of Arts. 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases.
These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but
also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law.
It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same
modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of
these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even
trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. That is the reason why
at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that
every bench of the Administrative Tribunal should consist of one judicial
member one administrative member and there should be no preponderance of
administrative members on any bench. Of course, the presence of the
administrative member would provide input of practical experience in the
functioning of the services and add to the efficiency of the Administrative
Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing
the legal input or not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair
the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to
the High Court. Now S. 6 provides that the Chairman of the Administrative
Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should
have for at least two years held office of Vice-Chairman or he should have for
at least two years held the post of Secretary to the Government of India .or
any other post under the Central or State Government carrying a scale of pay
which is not less than that of a Secretary to the, Government of India. I
entirely agree with Ranganath Misra, J. that the Chairman of the Administrative
Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should
have for at least two years held office as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office
as Vice-Chairman for a period of at least two years he would have gathered
sufficient experience and also within such period of two years, acquired
reasonable familiarity with the constitutional and legal questions involved in
service matters. But substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a
Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a
Secretary to the Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would
not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render
the Administrative Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism
than the High Court. We cannot afford to forget that it is the High Court which
is being supplanted by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as
to inspire confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent and
expert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I must make
it clear that when I say this, I do not wish to cast any reflection on the
members of the Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country,
brilliant civil servants who possess tremendous sincerity, drive and initiative
and who have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrative
problems of great complexity. But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which
is intended to supplant the High Court is legal training and experience. I am,
therefore, of the view, in agreement with Ranganath Misra, J. that Cl. (c) of
S. 6(l) must be struck down invalid.
It is now well-settled as a result of the decision of this
Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 206: (AIR 1980 SC
1789) that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution
and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can
abrogate it or take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or
taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is. It is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional scheme that every organ of the State, every
authority under the Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and
has to act within the limits of such power. It is a limited Government which we
have under the Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to
act within the limits of the power conferred upon them under the Constitution.
Now a question may arise as to what are the powers of the Executive and whether
the Executive has acted within the scope of its power. Such a question
obviously cannot be left to the Executive to decide and for two very good
reasons. First the decision of the question would depend upon the
interpretation of the Constitution and the laws and this would pre-eminently be
a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which
alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the
constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become
illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own
action. So also if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in
making the law, the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative
competence or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions
of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left to
the determination of the legislature. The Constitution has, therefore created
an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent
machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to
determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation
passed by the legislature. The judiciary is constituted the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution and to it is assigned the delicate task of
determining what is the extent and scope of the power conferred on each branch
of Government, what are the limits on the exercise of such power under the
Constitution and whether any action of any branch transgresses such limits. It
is also a basic principle of the Rule of Law which permeates every provision of
the Constitution and which forms its very core and essence that the exercise of
power by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by
the Constitution but also be in accordance with law and it is the judiciary
which has to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the
requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This
function is discharged by the judiciary by exercise of the power of judicial
review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for
maintenance of the Rule of Law. The power of judicial review is an integral
part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government
of laws and the Rule of Law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of
unreality. That is why I observed in my judgement in Minerva Mills Ltd. case,
(AIR 1980 SC 1789) (supra) at pages 287 and 288 of (1981) 1 SCR: (at p. 1825
and 1826 of AIR) :-
"I am of the view that if there is one feature of our
Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the
maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial
review and it is unquestionably. To my mind, part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that
however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for
judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish to emphasis is
that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be
abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a
constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is
provided that the validity of any law made by the Legislature shall not be
liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the
legislative competence of the legislature or is violative of any fundamental
rights, it @page-SC 389 would be nothing short of subversion of the
Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights
meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has
the effect of taking away the power of judicial review and providing that no
amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be questioned on any
ground, even if such amendment is violative of the basic structure and,
therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would be making
Parliament sole judge of the constitutional validity of what it has done and
that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending
power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution. The
conclusion must therefore inevitably follow that Cl. (4) of the Art. 368 is
unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the
Constitution."
It is undoubtedly true that my judgement in Minerva Mills
Ltd. case (AIR 1980 SC 1789) (supra) was a minority judgement but so far as
this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held
that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and
it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the
Constitution and it is equally clear from the same decision that though
judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the
Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can certainly,
without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, set up effective
alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review. The
basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it
would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to
substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional
mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is not less
efficacious than the High Court. Then, instead of the High Court, it would be
another institutional mechanisin or authority which would be exercising the
power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional
limitations and maintaining the Rule of Law. Therefore, if any constitutional
amendment made by Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of
judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional
mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure
doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, namely, that the
alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the parliamentary
amendment is no less effective than the High Court.
3. Here, in the present case, the impugned Act has been
enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by Cl. (1) of Art.
323-A which was introduced in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendment)
Act, 1976. Cl. (2)(d) of this Article provides that a law made by Parliament
under Cl. (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of Courts, except the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Art. 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints
referred to in Cl. (1). The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Arts. 226 and 227 by any law made by Parliament under Cl. (1) of Art.
323A is, therefore, specifically authorised by the constitutional amendment
enacted in Cl. (2)(d) of that Article. It is clear from the discussion in the
preceding paragraph that this constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 postulates for its
validity that the law made under Cl. (1) of Art. 323A excluding the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 must provide for an
effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judicial review.
If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under Cl. (1) of
Art. 323A to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227
without setting up an effective alternative institutional mechanism or
arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure
doctrine and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament. It must,
therefore, be read as implicit in this constitutional amendment that the law
excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227
permissible under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective
institutional mechanism or @page-SC 390 authority and vest the power of
judicial review in it. Consequently, the impugned Act excluding the
jurisdiction of the High Court Under Arts. 226 and 227 in respect of service
matters and vesting such jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal can pass
the test of constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage of Cl.
(2)(d) of Art. 323A, only if it can be shown that the Administrative Tribunal
set up under the impugned Act is equally efficacious as the High Court, so far
as the power of judicial review over service matter is concerned. We must,
therefore, address ourselves to the question whether the Administrative Tribunal
established under the impugned Act can be regarded as equally effective and
efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review as the High Court acting
under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
4. It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters
which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and
227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up
under the impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and
applicability of Arts. 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases.
These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but
also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law.
It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same
modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of
these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even
trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. That is the reason why
at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that
every bench of the Administrative Tribunal should consist of one judicial
member one administrative member and there should be no preponderance of administrative
members on any bench. Of course, the presence of the administrative member
would provide input of practical experience in the functioning of the services
and add to the efficiency of the Administrative Tribunal but the legal input
would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not
giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and
effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court. Now
S. 6 provides that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or
should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at least two
years held office of Vice-Chairman or he should have for at least two years
held the post of Secretary to the Government of India .or any other post under
the Central or State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than
that of a Secretary to the, Government of India. I entirely agree with
Ranganath Misra, J. that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be
or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have for at least two
years held office as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office as Vice-Chairman for
a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficient experience and
also within such period of two years, acquired reasonable familiarity with the
constitutional and legal questions involved in service matters. But
substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the
Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary to the Government
and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fail to inspire
confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal
a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the High Court. We cannot
afford to forget that it is the High Court which is being supplanted by the
Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as to inspire confidence in
the public mind that it is a highly competent and expert mechanism with
judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I must make it clear that when I
say this, I do not wish to cast any reflection on the members of the Civil
Services because fortunately we have, in our country, brilliant civil servants
who possess tremendous sincerity, drive and initiative and who have remarkable
capacity to resolve and overcome administrative problems of great complexity.
But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to supplant the
High Court is legal training and experience. I am, therefore, of the view, in
agreement with Ranganath Misra, J. that Cl. (c) of S. 6(l) must be struck down
invalid.
It is now well-settled as a result of the decision of this
Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 206: (AIR 1980 SC
1789) that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution
and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can
abrogate it or take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or
taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is. It is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional scheme that every organ of the State, every
authority under the Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and
has to act within the limits of such power. It is a limited Government which we
have under the Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to
act within the limits of the power conferred upon them under the Constitution.
Now a question may arise as to what are the powers of the Executive and whether
the Executive has acted within the scope of its power. Such a question
obviously cannot be left to the Executive to decide and for two very good
reasons. First the decision of the question would depend upon the
interpretation of the Constitution and the laws and this would pre-eminently be
a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which
alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the
constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become
illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own
action. So also if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in
making the law, the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative
competence or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other
provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be
left to the determination of the legislature. The Constitution has, therefore
created an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent
machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to
determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation
passed by the legislature. The judiciary is constituted the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution and to it is assigned the delicate task of
determining what is the extent and scope of the power conferred on each branch
of Government, what are the limits on the exercise of such power under the
Constitution and whether any action of any branch transgresses such limits. It
is also a basic principle of the Rule of Law which permeates every provision of
the Constitution and which forms its very core and essence that the exercise of
power by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by
the Constitution but also be in accordance with law and it is the judiciary
which has to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the
requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This
function is discharged by the judiciary by exercise of the power of judicial
review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for
maintenance of the Rule of Law. The power of judicial review is an integral
part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government
of laws and the Rule of Law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of
unreality. That is why I observed in my judgement in Minerva Mills Ltd. case,
(AIR 1980 SC 1789) (supra) at pages 287 and 288 of (1981) 1 SCR: (at p. 1825
and 1826 of AIR) :-
"I am of the view that if there is one feature of our
Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the
maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial
review and it is unquestionably. To my mind, part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that
however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for
judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish to emphasis is
that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be
abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a
constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is
provided that the validity of any law made by the Legislature shall not be
liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the
legislative competence of the legislature or is violative of any fundamental
rights, it @page-SC 389 would be nothing short of subversion of the
Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights
meaningless and futile. So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has
the effect of taking away the power of judicial review and providing that no
amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be questioned on any
ground, even if such amendment is violative of the basic structure and,
therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would be making
Parliament sole judge of the constitutional validity of what it has done and
that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending
power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution. The
conclusion must therefore inevitably follow that Cl. (4) of the Art. 368 is
unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the
Constitution."
Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than
that of a Secretary to the, Government of India. I entirely agree with
Ranganath Misra, J. that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be
or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have for at least two
years held office as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office as Vice-Chairman for
a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficient experience and
also within such period of two years, acquired reasonable familiarity with the
constitutional and legal questions involved in service matters. But
substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the
Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary to the
Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fail to
inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative
Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the High Court.
We cannot afford to forget that it is the High Court which is being supplanted
by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as to inspire
confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent and expert
mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I must make it
clear that when I say this, I do not wish to cast any reflection on the members
of the Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country, brilliant
civil servants who possess tremendous sincerity, drive and initiative and who
have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrative problems of
great complexity. But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended
to supplant the High Court is legal training and experience. I am, therefore,
of the view, in agreement with Ranganath Misra, J. that Cl. (c) of S. 6(l) must
be struck down invalid.
. In order to consider and determine this question it is
relevant to look into the Regulations made by the Indian Medical Council under
S. 33 of the said Act. The Regulations have been enumerated at pages 45. These
Regulations thus provide that the students of post-graduate training are to be
selected strictly on merit judged on the basis of academic record in the
under-graduate course and that all selections for post-graduate studies are to
be conducted by the Universities besides looking to the other criteria
regarding rotating internship, housemanship, etc. The Government of Uttar
Pradesh issued a notice on 15-10-1982 inviting applications in prescribed form
for admission to the postgraduate degree and diploma courses for the different
Medical Colleges of the province. In para 4 of the said notice it has been
specifically provided that the minimum eligibility qualification of the
applicants would be according to the recommendations of the Medical Council of
India. On 15-12-1982, the Government issued another order laying down the
policy and procedure to be followed with regard to the admission of candidates
to the post-graduate courses (both degree and @page-SC 404 diploma) in State
Medical Colleges. In this order in para 6 it has been specifically provided
that "no candidate shall be eligible for admission for post-graduate
degree or diploma course who has obtained less than 55% and 52% marks
respectively for the two courses (degree and diploma) on merit to be calculated
in accordance with para 2 of the said order." It is this eligibility
criterion laid down in the said Government order which is the subject matter of
challenge in these appeals and writ petitions before this Court.
The said order modifies to a certain extent the earlier
notification issued on 15-10-1982 inviting applications for admission to the
post-graduate courses as per notification dated 3-12-1980. In the notification
dated 3-12-1080, the criterion for admission to the post-graduate courses was
on the basis of merit only. In para 2 of the said order the manner how the
merit is to be determined has been laid down. In that order there was no such
criterion laid down as mentioned in the Government order dated 15-12-1982. Two
questions arise for our consideration which are firstly whether the State
Government is competent to make the aforesaid order in question in exercise of
its executive powers under Art. 162 of the Constitution. This Article
specifically provides that the executive powers of the State shall extend to
matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make
laws. Entry 25 of the Concurrent List i.e. List III of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution provides as follows :-
"Education, including technical education, medical
education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and
66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour."
15. The State Government can in exercise of its executive
power make an order relating to matters referred to in entry 25 of the
Concurrent List in the absence of any law made by the State Legislature. The
impugned order made by the State Government pursuant to its executive powers
laying down the eligibility qualification for the candidates to be considered
on merits for admission to the post-graduate courses in Medical Colleges in the
State is valid and it cannot be assailed on the ground that it is beyond the
competence of the State Government to make such order provided it does not
encroach upon or infringe the power of the Central Government as well as the
Parliament provided in entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is in the
following terms :-
"Co-ordination and determination of standards in
institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical
institutions."
. What relevance the above decision has to the facts of the
present case is also beyond us. It is not possible to equate the members of the
Scheduled Castes with goods imported from abroad. They are human beings like
all other human beings, the only difference being that for centuries a large
number of their countrymen have not treated them as human beings but as
sub-human creatures beyond the pale of society and even of humanity. William
Blake in his poem "Auguries of Innocence" said :
"Every Night and every Morn
Some to Misery are Born.
Every Morn and every Night
Some are Born to sweet delight.
Some are Born to sweet delight,
Some are Born to Endless Night."
The members of the Scheduled Castes were the children of the
"Endless Night". Their birth-right was the badge of shame; their
inheritance, the overflowing cup of humiliation; their constant and closest
companion, degradation; the bride of their marriage, lifelong poverty; and
their only fault, to be born to their parents. They were denied education. They
were denied jobs except the lowest menial tasks. They were denied contact with
persons not belonging to their castes for their touch polluted and even their
shadow defiled, though the touch and the shadow of the animals did not, for men
rode on horses and elephants and on mules and camels and milked cows, goats and
buffaloes. They were denied worship and the doors of the temples were shut in
their faces for their very presence was supposed to offend the gods. All these
wrongs were done to them by those who fancied themselves their superiors. As
the anonymous satirist said
"We are the precious chosen few
Let all the rest be damned.
There's only room for one or two
"We can't have Heaven crammed."
The treatment meted out to the members of the Scheduled
Castes throughout the ages was an affront to Human Rights. It was in a spirit
of atonement for the wrongs done to them and to make restitution for the injury
and injustice inflicted upon them that the framers of the Constitution enacted
Article 16(4) placing them in a separate class in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State, formulated the
Directive Principle embodied in Article 46, and proclaimed the great
Constitutional mandate set out in Article 335.
Children are the citizens of the future era. On the proper bringing;
up of children and giving them the proper training to turn out to be good
citizens depends the future of the country. In recent years, this position has
been well realised. The Children Act, 1948, has made elaborate provisions to
cover the International Charters relating to the rights of children and if
these provisions are properly translated into action and the authorities
created under the Act become cognisant of their role, duties and obligation in
the performance of the statutory mechanism created under the Act and they are
properly motivated to meet the situations that arise in handling the problems,
the situation would certainly be very much eased. It is very much necessary,
therefore, that officers at the different level called upon to perform
statutory duties by exercising powers conferred under the Statute have to be
given the proper training and only when they had the requisite capacity in them
should they be called upon to handle the situation. (Paras 5, 6)
It is not necessary that for employment in children's home,
the children should be given remuneration. Children in Observation Homes should
not be made to stay long and as long as they are there, they should be kept
occupied and the occupation should be congenial and intended to bring about
adaptability in life aided at bringing about a self-confidence and picking of
humane virtues. (Para 8) @page-SC 657
Dedicated workers have to be found out, proper training to
them has to be imparted and such people alone should be introduced into the
children homes. (Para 9)
The Juvenile Court has to be manned by a Judicial Officer
with some special training. Creation of a Court with usual Judicial Officer and
labelling it as Juvenile Court does not serve the requirement of the statute.
If that were so, the statutes have no necessity of providing a Juvenile Court.
The statutory scheme contemplates a Judicial Officer of a different type with a
more sensitive approach-oriented outlook. (Para 10)
A problem child is indeed a negative factor. Every society must,
therefore, devote full attention to ensure that children are properly cared for
and brought up in a proper atmosphere where they could receive adequate
training, education and guidance in order that they may be able to have their
rightful place in the society when they grow up. (Para 11)
The Children Aid Society should have been treated as a State
within the meaning of Art. 12 as it is undoubtedly an instrumentality of the
State. The Society has, therefore, to regulate its activities not only in accordance
with the statutory requirements but also act in a manner satisfying the
requirements of the Constitutional provisions in Arts. 21 and 24 as also the
Directive Principles of the State Policy. (Para 12)
Righteousness
never leaves man’s side
I joined the legal profession in June 1974, Earlier I was
supervising my landed property in district Mainpuri as there was no one to look
after the property after my father’s death in 1971.
Since I have seen the miserable conditions prevalent amongst
the farmers I have always wanted to work for the downtrodden.
The jurisdiction in the courts is like the construction of a
building: it is eitherperfect or has many defects.The final word of posterity
depends on the skill and calibre of the builder. He may desire to build like an
expert builder with Architectonic viruses to amend and add some material both
by method and uniformity .But if the structure itself lacks ventilation and
wants in windows and sufficient light carries any other deficiency then it will
ultimately collapse .
Likewise justice should speak in a language that is easy to
understand .The common man needs to understand and know what is spoken .He
cannot understand anything if the language is not cut out for him.Lastly, I
quote a verse from Manusmriti and other scriptures:’all the members of the
court are considered as wounded, where justice is found wounded with inequity,
and judges do not extract the dart of inequity from justice or remove its blot
and destroy inequity’. In other words if the innocents are not respected and
criminals not punished justice will not play its given role.
In this world, justice and righteousness alone are a man’s
friends. These go with him after death. All other things or companions part
with the destruction of the body and he is detached from all company. But the
company of justice is never cut off.
MOST INCONGRUOUS ARGUMENTS
Believe it or not, the most incongruous arguments can
sometimes find a suitor. Were it not so, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh could
not have taken the view that occupation or user of lands and buildings for the
purpose of running horse races, and for training the horses, etc. constitutes
occupation or user of the property for a 'charitable' purpose. What the High
Court has completely' failed to realize is that the 'occupation' of the land
and buildings or the 'user' of the land and buildings must be for a 'charitable
purpose' and that it is altogether irrelevant as to the manner in which the
income of the club is utilised. Section 202(l)(b) makes no reference. to the
question as regards the employment of the income of the club or the purpose for
which the income is so employed. Exemption is granted only in respect of
buildings which are 'solely' used, meaning thereby exclusively used, for
charitable purpose. For instance, if the premises are occupied for the purposes
of benevolent activities such as the running of a free dispensary or clinic or
for running of a free school for the children, such user of the building would
constitute a user for a charitable purpose and entitle the owner of the
building to claim exemption. It is impossible to subscribe to the view that
occupation or user for 'any' purpose would constitute a user for a charitable
purpose provided the income is used for a charitable purpose. Clutching at the
tail of this reasoning, one would be induced to the conclusion that user of a
building for running a common gaming house (or for any immoral or illegal
purpose) would be user for a 'charitable' purpose provided the income of the
common gaming house is utilised for a charitable purpose. The argument deserves
no further scrutiny and must be rejected outright. No further exercise need be
undertaken in order to find out whether or not S. 202(l)(b) is attracted in the
facts of the present matter. The judgment of the High Court in so far as the
High Court holds that S. 202(l)(b) is attracted must therefore be reversed and
set aside. We are of the opinion that the user of the premises for the Race
Course Club will not constitute occupation or user for a charitable purpose
within the meaning of S. 202(1)(b) and the Race Course Club will not be
entitled to claim exemption from levy of general tax.
Two other questions have been agitated by the Appellant
Municipal Corporation. First, whether the general tax could have been lawfully
levied for the assessment year 1966-67. The High Court has rightly taken a view
adverse to. the appellant on an appreciation of evidence. We do not see any
fallacy in the reasoning of the High Court. We therefore do not propose to disturb
the finding recorded by the High Court in so far as this question is concerned.
Secondly, as regards the valuation of the property. The learned Judge of the
Small Cause Court has valued the property at Rs. 4 lakhs. The valuation made by
the Small Cause Court has been confirmed by the High Court. We see no reason to
interfere with the valuation as made by the Small Cause Court and confirmed by
the High Court. Accordingly, in so far as these two points are concerned, the
decision rendered by the High Court must be confirmed.
The appeals are therefore partly allowed to the aforesaid
extent. The order passed by the High Court in so far as it is held that the
property is exempt from levy of general tax under S. 202(l)(b) is set aside.
The appellant would be entitled to levy general tax from 1967-68 onwards in
accordance with law. The appeals are partly allowed to this extent. There will
be no order as to costs.
DYING DECLARATION WAS FULLY CONSISTENT
"When the deponent (while making his dying declaration)
was in severe bodily pain (because of stab injuries in the abdomen) and words
were scarce, his natural impulse would be to tell the Magistrate, without
wasting his breath on details as to who had stabbed him. The very brevity of
the dying declaration, in the circumstances of the case, far from being a
suspicious circumstance, was an index of its being true and free from the taint
of tutoring, more so when the substratum of the dying declaration was fully
consistent with the ocular account given by the eye-witnesses."
"SUB-SECTION (5) TO SECTION 437
"Sub-section (5) to Section 437 is important. It
provides that any Court which has released a person on bail under sub-section
(1) or subsection (2), may, if it considers it necessary so to do, direct that
such person be arrested and commit him to custody. As under Section 167(2) a
person who has been released on the ground that he had been in custody for a
period of over sixty days is deemed to be released under the provisions of
Chapter XXXIII, his release should be considered as one under S. 437(1) or (2).
Section 437(5) empowers the Court to direct that the person so released may be
arrested if it considers it necessary to do so. The power of the Court to
cancel bail if it considers it necessary is preserved in cases where a person
has been released on bail under S. 437(1) or (2) and these provisions are
applicable to a person who has been released under Section 167(2). Under
Section 437(2) when a person is released pending inquiry on the ground that
there are not sufficient grounds to believe that he has committed a
non-bailable offence may be committed to custody by Court which released him on
bail if it is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for so doing after
inquiry is completed. As the provisions of Section 437(1) (2) and (5) are
applicable to a person who has been released under Section 167(2) the mere fact
that subsequent to his release a challan has been filed, is not sufficient to
commit him to custody. In this case the bail was cancelled and the appellants
were ordered to be arrested and committed to custody on the ground that
subsequently a charge-sheet had been filed and that before the appellants were
directed to be released under Section 167(2) their bail petitions were
dismissed on merits by the Sessions Court and the High Court. The fact that
before an order was passed under Section 167(2) the bail petitions of the
accused were dismissed on merits is not relevant for the purpose of taking
action under Section 437(5). Neither is it a valid ground that subsequent to
release of the appetlants a challan was filed by the police. The Court before
directing the arrest of the accused and committing them to custody should
consider it necessary to do so under Section 437(5). This may be done by the
Court coming to the conclusion that after the challan had been filed there are
sufficient grounds that the accused had committed a non-bailable offence and
that it is necessary that he should be arrested and committed to custody. It
may also order arrest and committal to custody on other grounds such as
tampering of the evidence or that his being at large is not in the interests of
justice. But it is necessary that the Court should proceed on the basis that he
has been deemed to have been released under Section 437(1) and (2)."
The result of our discussion and the case-law in this: An
order for release on bail made under the proviso to S. 167(2) is not defeated
by lapse of time, the filing of the charge-sheet or by remand to custody under
S. 309(2). The order for release on bail may however be cancelled under S.
437(5) or S. 439(2). Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly,
are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration
of justice, or evasion or attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of
the liberty granted to him. The due administration of justice may be interfered
with by intimidating or suborning witnesses, by interfering with investigation,
by creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of justice may
be evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the country or going underground
or otherwise placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may abuse the
liberty granted to him by indulging in similar or other unlawful acts. Where
bail has been granted under the proviso to S. 167(2) for the default of the
prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days. after the defect
is cured by the filing of a charge-sheet, the prosecution may seek to have the
bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to
arrest him and commit him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would
expect very strong grounds indeed.
The law and order situation in the state has deteriorated rapidly after the SP came to power. In fact, there are 19 ministers out of total 52 in Akhilesh's cabinet with criminal record. The seriousness could be gauged from the fact that there have been around 20 incidents in which police was assaulted by criminals or SP workers in different parts of the state in five months of SP rule. Five incidents of communal violence have also taken place.
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